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I. INTRODUCTION
"[Tihe Metaverse is wide open and undefended, like airports in the
days before bombs and metal detectors, like elementary schools in the days
before maniacs with assault rifles. Anyone can go in and do anything they
want to. There are no cops. You can't defend yourself, you can't chase the
bad people. ,,
t J.D. Candidate, the Catholic University of America, Columbus School of
Law, May 2009. Comments encouraged at LandmanStephen@yahoo.com.
1. NEAL STEPHENSON, SNOW CRASH 328 (1992). Fiction author Stephenson is
credited with coining the phrase "metaverse," a virtual world where individuals can
interact with each other through an online version of the real world. This article
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1
Landman: Funding Bin Laden's Avatar: A Proposal for the Regulation of Virt
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2009
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW
For nearly a decade, the United States has conducted
operations aimed at destroying suspected terrorist training camps
from the deserts of Sudan to the mountains of Afghanistan and
many places in between. Yet, one need only open a newspaper to
see that groups such as al Qaeda, Hezbollah, Hamas, and their ilk
still retain the ability to effectively plan, finance, and carry out
attacks. This is due, in part, to an unintended consequence of the
war on terrorism: the ability of terrorist groups to almost seamlessly
transition from the battlefields of the Middle East and northern
Africa to the virtual worlds of the Internet.3
Although groups like al Qaeda consistently demonstrate an• 4
aptitude for adapting to changing technologies, the accessibility of
the Internet has expanded every facet of their operations, from the
spread of propaganda to the planning, financing, and preparation
of terrorist attacks. 5  As traditional modes of operation are
identified, terrorism has evolved by exploiting many of the
attributes for which the Internet has become so popular. The
Internet's ease of access, fast flow of information, anonymity of
communications, and dearth of regulation have revolutionized the
command and control structure of modern terrorist organizations.6
Once constrained by real-world impediments, terrorist groups
now have unlimited resources at their disposal by shifting to the use
uses the term "virtual world," generally considered synonymous with "metaverse."
2. See, e.g., Isabel Kershner, Israel: 6 Charged in al Qaeda Plan, N.Y. TIMES, July
19, 2008, at A6 (discussing the breakup of an al Qaeda cell attempting to attack
President Bush's helicopter); Robert F. Warth & Nada Bakri, Hezbollah Seizes Swath
of Beirut from US.-Backed Lebanon Government, N.Y. TIMES, May 10, 2008, at A5
(discussing Hezbollah's recent incursion and seizure of Western Beirut).
3. See generally Terrorist/Jihadist Use of the Internet for Strategic Communications:
Hearing Before the H. Permanent Select Comm. on Intelligence, 109th Cong. (May 4,
2006) (statement of Dr. Bruce Hoffman, Corporate Chair, Counterterrorism and
Counterinsurgency & Director, RAND Corp.), available at
http://intelligence.house.gov/Media/PDFS/Hoffman4May06.pdf.
4. See JOHN ROTH, DOUGLAS GREENBURG & SERENA WILLE, NAT'L COMM'N ON
TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE U.S., MONOGRAPH ON TERRORIST FINANCING 29
[hereinafter MONOGRAPH], available at http://wvv.9-
1 lcommission.gov/staff-statements/911_TerrFin-Monograph.pdf (last visited
Apr. 2, 2009) ("[All Qaeda adapts quickly and effectively, creating new difficulties
in understanding its financial picture.").
5. See GABRIEL WEIMANN, U.S. INST. OF PEACE, SPECIAL REPORT No. 116,
WWW.TERROR.NET: How MODERN TERRORISM USES THE INTERNET 3 (Mar. 2004),
available at http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/srI16.pdf ("[T] he Internet
is ... an ideal arena for activity by terrorist organizations.").
6. Id.
5160 [Vol. 35:5
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of developing technologies and exploiting a wide range of digital
platforms in order to meet their organizational needs. From
password-protected discussion forums to encrypted websites, the
ability of terrorist groups to take advantage of technology is limited
only by their creativity and the availability of the platforms.
Terrorist groups have shifted from the battlefields and training
camps of the Middle East to the virtual worlds of the Internet.
Virtual worlds are computer-based, simulated environments
where millions of users can interact with each other on a daily
basis. 7 Once in-world, users participate in many of the same real-
world activities of their daily lives. Because virtual worlds are meant
to mirror the real world, many have virtual economies, allowing
users to not only connect with one another, but also to conduct
financial transactions. Two of the more popular, and arguably
advanced, of the virtual words are Second Life (SL) and Entropia
Universe (EU).' Although the ability to buy, trade, and sell both
tangible and intangible items in virtual worlds like SL and EU
offers an entirely new marketplace for goods, these virtual
economies are potentially vulnerable to exploitation by terrorist
financiers. 10
One of the prime objectives of the war on terror is to prevent
the free flow of money to international terrorist organizations. " As
7. Virtual worlds go by many names, but, at their most basic level, they are
"computer based, simulated, persistent environments that support synchronous
interactions between users personified as avatars." Online Virtual Worlds:
Applications and Avatars in a User-Generated Medium: Hearing Before the H. Subcornm.
on Telecom. and the Internet, 110th Cong. 2 (Apr. 1, 2008) (statement of Dr. Colin J.
Parris, Vice President, Digital Convergence, IBM Corp.).
8. See id. at 7 (discussing social networking and economic capabilities of
virtual worlds).
9. See generallyJonathan Fildes, The Ever-Expanding Metaverse, BBC NEWS, Nov.
3, 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/6111738.stm. SL and EU allow
users to buy, sell, and transfer real-world currency for Lindens and Peds,
respectively. Avatrian Homepage, http://www.avatrian.com/virtualworlds.php
(last visited Apr. 2, 2009).
10. See generally Izelde Van Jaarsveld, Following the Money Across Cyber Highways:
A Herculean Task or International Challenge? Some Thoughts on Money Laundering on the
Internet, 16 S. AFR. MERCANTILE L. J. 685 (2004) (highlighting potential Internet
abuse by money launderers and attempts to prevent such abuse).
11. President's Address Before a Joint Session of Congress on the United
States Response to the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 37 WEEKLY COMP. PRES.
Doc. 1347 (Sept. 20, 2001) [hereinafter Presidential Address] ('"We will direct
every resource at our command, every means of diplomacy, every tool of
intelligence, every instrument of law enforcement, every financial influence ... to
the disruption and to the defeat of the global terror network.").
51612009]
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U.S. and international law enforcement officials continue to curb
abuse of the formal financial sector-e.g., banks-terrorist
financiers have shifted to underground banking. Broad in scope,
"underground banking" refers to almost any type of informal value
transfer system outside traditional banking. 13  Underground
banking attracts terrorist financiers with its anonymity and lack of
regulation, two key attributes of the developing economies within
virtual worlds. As financial transactions within virtual worlds
become more accessible and widespread, law enforcement officials
must recognize the potential for abuse by groups seeking to carry
out acts of terrorism and respond vigorously. Accordingly, any
counterterrorist financing policies must not only reduce the use of
known underground banking methods, but also institute effective
recordkeeping and reporting requirements to prevent the abuse of
new methods of transferring funds.
This article explores the use of the Internet by international
terrorist organizations generally, concentrating on virtual worlds as
a means for such organizations to plan, finance, and carry out
attacks. Part I discusses numerous ways in which the Internet and
other technological innovations have affected terrorist groups,
tracing the platforms used and the activities engaged in by these
organizations, broadly defined as the "virtualization of terrorism.',1
4
Part II examines the evolution of terrorist financing, suggesting
that, as terrorists continue to adapt to new and developing
technologies, law enforcement officials and policymakers must
recognize the vulnerability of virtual worlds as the new front in the
war on terrorist financiers. 5  Part III then analyzes the existing
regulatory regime for countering terrorist financing, explaining
that, as additional enforcement mechanisms have reduced the
12. See generally U.S. GEN. AcCOUNTING OFFICE, TERRORIST FINANCING: U.S.
AGENCIES SHOULD SYSTEMATICALLY ASSESS TERRORISTS' USE OF ALTERNATIVE
FINANCING MECHANISMS 9 (2003) [hereinafter USE OF ALTERNATIVE FINANCING
MECHANISMS], available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04163.pdf ("Terrorists
use an assortment of alternative financing mechanisms to earn, move, and store
their assets.").
13. See U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY, A REPORT TO THE CONGRESS IN ACCORDANCE
WITH SECTION 359 OF THE UNITING AND STRENGTHENING AMERICA BY PROVIDING
APPROPRIATE TooLS REQUIRED TO INTERCEPT AND OBSTRUCT TERRORISM ACT or 2001
5-6 (Nov. 2002) [hereinafter REPORT TO CONGRESS], available at
http://www.fincen.gov/news room/ rp/files/ hawalarptfinalI11222002.pdf
(discussing the use of informal value transfer systems to raise and move money).
14. See infta Part 1.
15. See infra Part II.
5162 [Vol. 35:5
4
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 35, Iss. 5 [2009], Art. 15
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol35/iss5/15
VIRTUAL HAWALAS
vulnerability of formal financial institutions, informal systems such
as virtual worlds remain largely open to terrorist dollars.' 6 This
article concludes by proposing that law enforcement officials can
more effectively curb the abuse of both formal and informal
financial sectors by extending the existing regulatory regime to
virtual worlds. 7
II. THE VIRTUALIZATION OF TERRORISM
"[Y]ou didn't have to speak Arabic in the mid 90's to know that
terrorism had shifted its focus and you don't have to write code to
understand that has changed again."'
Before U.S. counterterrorism law and policy can begin to
combat the ongoing virtualization of terrorism effectively,
government officials must first understand how terrorist groups use
the Internet. When considering use of the Internet by terrorist
organizations, it is useful to distinguish two categories: (1) cyber-
terrorism, attacks aimed primarily at Internet targets, 9 and (2)
cyber-based terrorism, attacks that are undertaken in the real
world, but planned and financed in the virtual world. While the
threats posed to electronic infrastructure are significant, they are
20not the focus of this article . Instead, this article concentrates on
16. See infra Part III.
17. See infra Part IV.
18. Posting of Andrew Cochran to Counterterrorism Blog, Event Transcript
and Related Links: Meta-Terror: Terrorism and the Virtual World,
http://www.counterterrorismblog.org/2008/03/event-transcriptand-related-I.p
hp (Mar. 7, 2008, 14:37 EST) [hereinafter Meta-Terror] (statement of Roderick
Jones) (discussing the evolution of terrorism and highlighting the importance of
understanding the "virtualization of terrorism").
19. "Cyberterrorism" can be defined as "the politically motivated use of
computers as weapons or as targets, by sub-national groups or clandestine agents
intent on violence, to influence an audience or cause a government to change its
policies." Clay Wilson, Computer Attack and Cyber Terrorism: Vulnerabilities and Policy
Issues for Congress, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS, RL32114, Oct. 17, 2003, at 4, reprised
in Clay Wilson, Botnets, Cybercrime, and Cyberterrorism: Vulnerabilities and Policy Issues
for Congress, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS, RL32114, Jan. 29, 2008, at 3-4; see also
Mohammad Iqbal, Defining Cyberterrorism, 22J. MARSHALLJ. OF COMPUTER & INFO. L.
397 (2004) (overview of the evolution of cyberterrorism).
20. Cyberterrorism has been addressed by a number of scholarly journals.
See, e.g., Susan W. Brenner & Marc D. Goodman, In Defense of Cyberterrorism: An
Argument for Anticipating Cyber-Attacks, 2002 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL'Y 1 (2002)
(explaining inevitability of cyberterrorism and the need for American law
enforcement to remain vigilant); Tara Mythri Raghavan, In Fear of Cyberterrorism:
An Analysis of the Congressional Response, 2003 U. ILL.J. L. TECH. & POLY 297 (2003)
2009] 5163
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the equally troublesome use of new technologies to secretly
undertake what was once accomplished, or at least attempted, in
the real world.
A. The Marketplace of Terrorist Ideas Goes Digital
As cyber-based terrorism continues to expand, there are a few
areas in which terrorist groups have shown both desire and ability
to abuse otherwise legitimate systems to further their criminal ends.
A recent study found that although only half of the thirty
organizations designated as "Foreign Terrorist Organizations"
maintained websites in 1998," "by 2000, virtually all terrorist groups
had established their presence on the Internet. As these statistics
reflect, the Internet has significantly expanded the opportunities
available for terrorists to secure publicity and spread propaganda as
well as revolutionized the process of enlistment.
Prior to being captured by British investigators in the fall of
2005, a key conduit for al Qaeda online was Younis Tsouli, better
known as "Irhabi 007." As one news report declared: "Irhabi 007
had propelled thejihadists into a 21st century offensive through his
ability to covertly and securely disseminate manuals of weaponry,
videos of insurgents feats such as beheadings and other• ,- • .,,24
inflammatory material. By exploiting the Internet's anonymity
and dearth of regulation, Irhabi 007 and, others like him, have not
only expanded the ability of terrorist organizations to spread
propaganda and recruit new fighters, but also to undertake more
substantive offenses.2 5
(analyzing the evolution of cyber-security related laws in the United States).
21. See U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY, OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL, SPECIALLY
DESIGNATED NATIONALS & BLOCKED PERSONS,
http://www.treas.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/sdn/tl lsdn.pdf (last visited Apr.
2, 2009) (compilation of individuals and organizations identified by the U.S.
Government for their connection to terrorism); see also Audrey Kurth Cronin, The
"FTO List" and Congress: Sanctioning Designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations, CRS
REPORT FOR CONGRESS, RL32120, Oct. 21, 2003, at 1-3 (discussing the process of
designating an individual or entity as a terrorist).
22. WEIMANIN, supra note 5, at 2.
23. Id. at 2; see also id. at 1-4 (conducting a thorough evaluation of terrorist
presence on the Internet and breaking down the results by geographic location,
with the majority of groups located in the Middle East and Asia).
24. Rita Katz & Michael Kern, Terrorist 007, Exposed, WASH. POST, Mar. 26,
2006, at B01.
25. See id.
5164 [Vol. 35:5
6
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 35, Iss. 5 [2009], Art. 15
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol35/iss5/15
VIRTUAL HAWALAS
B. Virtual Terrorist Training Camps
By exploiting technology, terrorists can use the Internet to
plan and coordinate specific attacks. Primarily, the Internet serves
as a tool for intelligence-gathering, providing access to a broad
range of material on potential targets from simple maps to aerial
photographs. Israeli officials reported last year that "[m]ilitant
Palestinian groups who have been launching rockets into the
Western Negev from the Gaza Strip have been using Google's
popular satellite imagery program 'Google Earth' to reconnoiter
areas in Israel to be targeted for attack.
'
,1
6
As technology advances, computer-savvy terrorists can create
password-protected forums that operate as virtual terrorist training
camps. RoderickJones, former member of the United Kingdom's
Counter-Terrorism Command, explained that the worst-case
scenario is "an expert bomb maker conducting a virtual lecture
with his students all present and able to ask questions and check
their knowledge and virtually manipulate the necessary parts."
2 7
More disconcerting, however, is that terrorist groups can now
orchestrate training programs that would have been nearly
impossible in many of the training camps based in the Afghan
mountains and Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan.
For example, Microsoft's new program "Photosynth" allows users to
take a collection of photos of a location; have them analyzed for
similarities; and display them in a reconstructed three-dimensional
space.18 The potential for abuse of a program such as this is clear-
it provides terrorist groups a virtual world in which to essentially
"Red Team" potential attacks against a target prior to an attack."
26. Report: Militants Using Google Earth to Pick Targets in Israel, HAARETZ.COM,
Oct. 25, 2007, http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/917036.htm.
27. Meta-Terror, supra note 18 (statement of RoderickJones).
28. Microsoft Live Labs, What is Photosynth?, MICROSOFf CORP.,
http://photosynth.net/about.aspx (last visited Apr. 2, 2009).
29. The opposing force in a simulated military conflict is known as the "Red
Team" and is used to reveal weaknesses in current military readiness. See Marcus
Spade, Army Approves Plan to Create School for Red Teaming, July 13, 2005,
http://www.tradoc.army.mil/pao/tnsarchives/July05/070205.htm. These same
techniques could be used by terrorist groups. See Barton Gellman, FBI Fears al
Qaeda Cyber Attacks, S.F. CHRON., June 28, 2002, at Al (captured computer
contained engineering and structural architectural features of a dam, enabling al
Qaeda engineers and planners to simulate catastrophic failures).
2009] 5165
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C. Web-Based Terrorist Financing
The logistical implications of the virtualization of terrorism are
not limited to propaganda, recruitment, and e-learning. In order
to ensure continued survival, terrorists "need to raise funds [and]
open and use bank accounts to transfer money."30 For financing,
terrorist organizations historically have been attracted to operating
in unregulated jurisdictions-those "places with limited bank
supervision, no anti-money laundering laws, ineffective law
enforcement institutions, and a culture of no-questions-asked bank
secrecy."" The Internet, with its relative ease of use and anonymity,
satisfies many of these needs.
III. BY ANY MEANS NECESSARY: THE EVOLUTION OF TERRORIST
FINANCING
"There are two things a brother must always have for jihad, the self
and money. ,12
Although opinions differ on the operating costs for terrorist
organizations and the cost of an "average" terrorist attack, 4 a
30. A Review of the Material Support to Terrorism Prohibition Improvements Act:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Terrorism, Technology and Homeland Security of the S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. (Apr. 20, 2005) (statement of Barry Sabin,
Chief, Counterterrorism Section of the Criminal Division, Department ofJustice).
31. MAURICE R. GREENBERG ETAL., COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, TERRORIST
FINANCING: REPORT OF AN INDEPENDENT TASK FORCE SPONSORED BY THE COUNCIL ON
FOREIGN RELATIONS 9 (2002), available at
http://www.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/TerroristFinancingTF.p
df.
32. MONOGRAPH, supra note 4, at 17 n.5 (quoting an al Qaeda operative).
33. One source for deriving these estimates is the annual report of blocked
terrorist assets pursuant to economic sanctions issued by the U.S. Treasury
Department's Office of Foreign Asset Control. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY,
OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSET CONTROL, TERRORIST ASSETS REPORT: CALENDAR YEAR
2005, FOURTEENTH ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS ON ASSETS IN THE UNITED STATES
OF TERRORIST COUNTRIES AND INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM PROGRAM DESIGNEES 8
(showing that total assets blocked from seven terrorist groups totaled $13,793,102
in 2005), available at
http://www.treas.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/reports/tar2005.pdf.
34. See The Financing of Terror Organizations, Counterterror Initiatives in the Terror
Finance Program: Organization of Terror Groups for Funding and Future U.S. Responses:
Hearings Before the S. Comm. on Banking Housing and Urban Affairs, 108th Cong. 69
(2003) (statement of Dr. Louise Richardson, Executive Dean, Radcliffe Institute
for Advanced Study, Harvard University) (arguing that while 9/11 cost an
estimated half million dollars, the average terrorist attack costs much less); U.S.
DEP'T OF STATE, 2003 INT'L NARCOTICS CONTROL STRATEGY REPORT, PART II: MONEY
5166 [Vol. 35:5
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greater ability to track and restrict the sources of terrorist funding
would markedly deter the ability of terrorist groups to perpetrate
attacks. 5  Consequently, in the fight against international
terrorism, a prime objective of law enforcement and intelligence
agencies is restricting the free flow of money to terrorist
organizations.1
6
Despite law enforcement's best efforts, terrorists continue to
adapt and develop new methods of financing their organizations,
avoiding detection while maintaining a viable financial
infrastructure."s Depending on operational needs and existing
risks, al Qaeda can employ a variety of mechanisms to transfer its
wealth to areas where it is needed. As Dennis Lormel explains,
"[o] ne of the true challenges in dealing with terrorist financing is
the recognition of the dynamics of change, and understanding
that... financing methodologies will constantly change to avoid
detection. 39
LAUNDERING & FINANCIAL CRIMES (Mar. 2004),
http://www.state.gov/p/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2003/vol2/html/29843.htm ('Vhile
actual terrorist operations require only comparatively modest funding,
international terrorist groups need significant amounts of money to organize,
recruit, train and equip new adherents; and otherwise support their activities.").
The FBI concluded that the 9/11 attacks cost $303,672. Paul Beckett, Sept. 11
Attacks Cost $303,672, But Few Details of Plot Surface, WALL ST.J., May 15, 2002, at B4.
35. See Progress Since 9/11: The Effectiveness of US. Anti-Terrorist Financing Efforts:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the H. Comm. on
Financial Services, 108th Cong. 7 (Mar. 11, 2003) (testimony of Alice Fisher, Deputy
Assistant Attorney General, U.S. Department of Justice) (detailing the Justice
Department's terrorist financing enforcement programs).
36. See The Financial War on Terrorism, New Money Trails Present Fresh Challenges:
Hearing Before the S. Finance Comm., 108th Cong. 5 (2002) [hereinafter New Money
Trails] (statement of James Gurule, Undersecretary of Enforcement, U.S.
Department of the Treasury) (reporting that U.S. counterterrorist financing
strategy has been "to follow the money trail, and dismantle entire financial
networks and channels from moving money to finance terror"), available at
http://finance.senate.gov/hearings/84922.pdf.
37. See USE OF ALTERNATIVE FINANCING MECHANISMS, supra note 12, at 4; U.S.
GEN. ACCOuNTABILITY OFFICE, COMBATING TERRORISM, FEDERAL AGENCIES FACE
CONTINUING CHALLENGES IN ADDRESSING TERRORIST FINANCING AND MONEY
LAUNDERING 6 (2004), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04501t.pdf.
38. MONOGRAPH, supra note 4, at 52-53 ("The hijackers moved money into
the United States in three ways. They received wires totaling approximately
$130,000 from overseas facilitators in the United Arab Emirates and Germany;
they physically carried large amounts of cash and traveler's checks with them; and
some set up accounts overseas, which they accessed in the United States with
credit or ATM cards. Once here, the hijackers opened bank accounts in their real
names at U.S. Banks, which they used just as millions of other people do .... ).
39. Dennis Lormel, Terrorist Financing the Dynamics of Change, Jan. 11, 2005,
2009] 5167
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A. Formal Financial Institutions
The international banking system provides a broad array of
financial services and convenience unmatched by any other
monetary system in the world and, as a result, is the first choice for
most international organizations-legitimate or otherwise-to
move and store funds.4 0 The September 11 attacks are merely one
example in which terrorist groups exploited the weaknesses of the
formal financial system. 4' Each of the hijackers maintained
personal accounts at major financial institutions, such as Bank of
America and SunTrust, as well as smaller regional banks.42 While in
the United States, their expenses, including the actual cost of the
attacks, were funded by approximately $300,000 deposited using a
combination of wire transfers, traveler's checks, and debit or credit
cards with access to funds held in foreign financial institutions.43
Despite the administrative burdens, most financial institutions
have contributed tremendously to the global financial war on
terrorism.4  Recognizing the importance of inhibiting terrorist
financing and the difficulty associated with monitoring individual
transactions to determine the final destination of otherwise
innocuous funds, formal financial institutions have begun to
implement stricter oversight systems to better detect the financial
activity of terrorist organizations.4 5 The results have been reduced
http://www.corprisk.com/publications/press-releases/special-
reports/Terrorist%20Financing,%20the%20Dynamics%20of%2Ochange.pdf.
40. Cf MONOGRAPH, supra note 4, at 3 ("The September 11 hijackers used
U.S. and foreign financial institutions to hold, move, and retrieve their money.").
41. Id. at 131 ("The hijackers and their financial facilitators used the
anonymity provided by the huge international and domestic financial system to
move and store their money through a series of unremarkable transactions."); see
also Linde v. Arab Bank PLC, 384 F. Supp. 2d 571 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (alleging
material support of terrorists, victims of attacks in Israel file suit against Jordanian
bank); Weiss v. Nat'l Westminster Bank PLC, 453 F. Supp. 2d 609 (E.D.N.Y. 2006)
(alleging material support of terrorists, victims of attacks in Israel file suit against
British bank).
42. See MONOGRAPH, supra note 4, at 140.
43. See id. at 3.
44. See, e.g., Joseph M. Myers, The Silent Struggle Against Terrorist Financing, 6
GEO. J. INT'L AFF. 33, 35 (2005) ("The financial services sector, which had
previously opposed many of the PATRIOT Act provisions, was extraordinarily
cooperative and patient with the United States and other countries trying to
unravel the financial trail left by the 9/11 hijackers."); Leo Wolosky & Stephen
Heifetz, Regulating Terrorism, 34 L. & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 1, 1 (2002) (regulations now
require financial institutions to report on suspicious transactions).
45. See Adam Rombel, Banks Battle Terror Financing with Software, 16 GLOBAL
FINANCE 44 (2002) (discussing the niche industry born out of new compliance
5168 [Vol. 35:5
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vulnerability within the formal financial sector to terrorist
financing schemes. 46 Despite these successes, the informal banking• 47
system remains open for business to terrorist dollars•.
B. Informal Financial Institutions
Although existing regulatory mechanisms have been very
effective, terrorist organizations and their financiers remain highly
48
adaptive entities. Since they can no longer safely use the
international banking system, terrorist financiers have turned to
underground banking systems.4 9  Informal financial networks,
measures). But see Scot J. Paltrow, U.S. Says Banks Overreport Data for Patriot Act,
WALL ST.J.,July 7, 2005, at Cl.
46. See, e.g., Combating International Terrorist Financing: Hearing Before the H.
Financial Services Subcomm. on Domestic and International Monetary Policy, Trade and
Technology and Oversight and Investigations, 108th Cong. 1-2 (Sept. 30, 2004)
(prepared statement ofJuan Carlos Zarate, Assistant Secretary, Office of Terrorist
Financing and Financial Crimes, U.S. Department of the Treasury) ("[W]e have
developed international standards to fight terrorist financing, built greater global
capacity, broadened and deepened our own regulatory system, built international
systems to share information about suspect networks, frozen and seized terrorist-
related assets, arrested and isolated key financial intermediaries and donors, and
improved the international safeguards around the financial system."), available at
http://financialservices.house.gov/media/pdf/093004jz.pdf.
47. See Matthew A. Levitt, The Political Economy of Middle East Terrorism, 6
MIDDLE EAST REV. OF INT'L AFF., IssuE 4 (2002) ("Beyond the official international
banking system, unofficial banking systems and hawala are of particular
concern."), available at http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/2002/issue4/jv6n4a3.html.
48. See Eric J. Gouvin, Bringing Out the Big Guns: The USA Patriot Act, Money
Laundering, and the War on Terrorism, 55 BAXiiOR L. REv. 955, 962, 978 (2003); see
also Herbert V. Morais, Behind the Lines in the War on Terrorist Funding, 20 INT'L FIN.
L. REv. 34, 37 (2001) ("A fly in the ointment of law enforcement efforts to track
down, freeze and confiscate funds earmarked for terrorists is that some of these
funds are moved through 'underground banking' channels or alternative
remittance systems that are widely used in the Middle East and south Asia."); USE
OF ALTERNATIVE FINANCING MECHANISMS, supra note 12, at 30 ("[O]nce terrorists
know that authorities are scrutinizing a mechanism they use to earn, move, or
store assets, they may switch to an alternate industry, commodity, or fundraising
scheme to avoid detection.").
49. See REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 13, at 6; Alan Lambert, Organized
Crime, Terrorism and Money Laundering in the Americas: Underground Banking and
Financing of Terrorism, 15 FLA. J. INT'L L. 9, 12 (2002) (defining "underground
banking" as "that secretive and mysterious global structure for facilitating the
transfer of funds between countries without touching the recognized and
regulated international financial systems, and in most cases, without any
meaningful records being kept"); see generally New Money Trails, supra note 36, at 8
(prepared statement of Alan Larson, Under Secretary of State for Economic,
Business & Agricultural Affairs) (explaining that an increase in oversight and due
diligence in the non-Islamic banking system has prompted terrorist groups to shift
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collectively referred to as "informal value transfer systems" (IVTS), °
exist outside of the modern banking system but serve a similar
purpose-to facilitate the transfer of valued goods and money.
Although one obvious benefit of IVTS for terrorist financiers is
that it operates outside the bounds of the traditional financial
system, there are many other reasons why 1VTS may be preferred to
ordinary banks. IVTS are reliable, efficient, anonymous, and
available twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week. "  The true
extent of terrorist use of these systems is unknown, a result of both
the criminal nature of the activity and the lack of systematic data
collection and analysis.54 Estimates regarding the annual flow of
transactions through informal banking systems range from $200
billion to "tens of billions. 55 Others believe the amount cannot be
quantified with any certainty.56
The most well-known IVTS is hawala.57 Groups like al Qaeda
towards hawala and other alternative remittance systems).
50. Informal Value Transfer System is defined as a "system or network of
people facilitating, on a full-time or part-time basis, the transfer of value
domestically or internationally outside the conventional, regulated financial
institutional systems." NIKOS PASSAS, WODC, INFORMAL VALUE TRANSFER SYSTEMS &
CRIMINAL ORGANIZATIONS; A STUDY INTO So-CALLED UNDERGROUND BANKING
NETWORKS 11 (1999), available at
http://www.apgml.org/frameworks/docs/8/Informal%20Value%2Transfer%20
Systems% 20-%2OPassas.pdf.
51. Cf Amos N. Guiora & Brian J. Field, Using and Abusing the Financial
Markets: Money Laundering as the Achilles' Heel of Terrorism, 29 U. PA.J. INT'L L. 59, 62
(2007) ("[T]he use of Informal Value Transfer Systems ("IVTS") is commonly
referred to as 'underground banking' because, although operating akin to a
banking system, the IVTS does so without the formal requirements of institutional
banking.").
52. See Courtney J. Linn, One-Hour Money Laundering, 8 U.C. DAVIS Bus. L. J.
138, 2 (2007) ("Compared to banks, [non-bank financial institutions] face little
regulatory scrutiny, and tend to have fleeting relationships with their customers,
making customer due diligence very difficult."); U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY FIN.
CRIMES ENFORCEMENT NETwORK, FINCEN ADVISORY, INFORMAL VALUE TRANSFER
SYSTEMS 2-3 (2003) [hereinafter FINCEN ADVISORY], available at
http://www.fincen.gov/news.room/rp/advisory/pdf/advis33.pdf (highlighting
benefits to IVTS users).
53. See FINCEN ADVISORY, supra note 52, at 3; see also Alan Lambert,
Underground Banking and Financing of Terrorism, 15 FL.A.J. INT'LL. 3, 15 (2002).
54. USE OF ALTERNATIVE FINANCING MECHANISMS, supra note 12, at 3 ("[The
FBI] do[es] not systematically collect and analyze data on alternative financing
mechanisms.").
55. Id. at 24.
56. Id.
57. PASSAS, supra note 50, at 13-25 (outlining a family of traditional IVTS
systems with different names depending on geographic location and ethnic group
and identifying many varieties).
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have systematically used hawala because, unlike formal financial
institutions, they neither were traditionally subject to potential
government oversight nor did they keep detailed records. 5
Evidence shows "the hawala network has been used to funnel
money to terrorist groups in the disputed Kashmir valley... [and]
as a conduit for fundin the 1998 bombings of U.S. embassies in
Kenya and Tanzania. '  Recently, the U.S. Government, in
cooperation with international law enforcement, has worked to
curb the abuse of hawala, forcing terrorist financiers to find new
methods for transmitting money.
C. Virtual Worlds: The New Front in the War on Terrorist Financing
The expansion of the Internet and the evolution of 1VTS have
opened up virtual worlds as potentially useful mechanisms for
transferring funds to cells around the world. Virtual worlds provide
many of the same characteristics as the existing IVTS network: they
are fast, inexpensive, reliable, convenient, and-most notably-
discreet.6' Moreover, financiers no longer need to leave the
comfort of their own homes to successfully transfer large sums of
money to those looking to carry out horrific attacks. The
development of virtual economies, along with the dearth of
regulation, makes virtual worlds the new frontier in IVTS.
The ability to conduct real-time, in-world transactions in
58. MONOGRAPH, supra note 4, at 25; see also USA PATRIOT Act/Terrorism
Financing Operations Section: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Technology, Terrorism, and
Government Information of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. (Oct. 9, 2002)
(testimony of Dennis Lormel, Chief, Terrorist Financing Operations Section,
Counterterrorism Division, FBI) ("Informal Value Transfer systems, such as
'Hawalas,' also present problems for law enforcement. They permit terrorists a
means of transferring funds that is difficult to detect and trace. These informal
systems are commonplace and appear to serve as an efficient means of transacting
in mostly 'cash' societies such as Pakistan, Afghanistan, and the Phillippines
[sic].").
59. Lambert, supra note 53, at 12 (emphasis added).
60. See REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 13, at 6-10 (explaining that the Bank
Secrecy Act's recordkeeping and reporting requirements reach the types of
informal unconventional entities operating outside of the mainstream financial
system like hawala); see also supra Part III.A (discussing existing counterterrorist
financing regulations and their application to informal financial networks).
61. See Posting of David Grundy to MetaSecurity: Security of Virtual Worlds,
Virtual Worlds as a Possible Alternative Remittance System (ARS),
http://metasecurity.net/2007/06/25/irtual-worlds-as-a-possible-alternate-
remittance-system-ars/ (June 25, 2007) (discussing the potential use of virtual
worlds for money laundering and terrorist financing); see also supra Part I.B
(identifying vulnerabilities of virtual worlds).
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virtual currency that can then be exchanged for U.S. dollars or
62other regional currencies has made virtual worlds widely popular.
Virtual worlds allow users to transfer real funds in a variety of ways,
including credit cards, traditional bank accounts, pre-paid debit
cards, and PayPal accounts.6' Despite the obvious benefits of an
expanding virtual economy, officials must acknowledge that this
economy is no different than the real-world economy when it
comes to financial crime. Virtual worlds are especially susceptible
to manipulation by terrorist financiers because they escape
regulation and observation by law enforcement. 64
The primary concern is paltry customer identification rules
associated with virtual worlds. In traditional banking, customer
identification procedures are implemented both during account
origination and in subsequent transactions. However, the nature
of virtual worlds limits the ability to accurately identify customers at
each of these stages, rendering all customers more vulnerable to
financial crimes.
Currently, the virtual worlds of SL and EU have limited
abilities to verify their residents' identities. SL, for instance,
maintains few verification procedures for accurately confirming the
personal information of individuals who buy, sell, and transfer
Lindens in-world. 6' To the extent that Linden Labs was interested
62. See Meta-Terror, supra note 18.
63. Brian Monroe, ATM Cards Tied to Virtual Worlds a "Money Launderer's
Dream, " MONEY LAUNDERING ALERT, Dec. 2007,
http://www.moneylaundering.com/ArticleDisplay.aspx?id=3491 (non-subscriber
access by following "Printable Format"); Online Discussion with Evan Kohlmann,
International Terrorism Consultant, Al Qaeda and the Internet, WASH. POST, Aug. 8,
2005, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/discussion/2005/8/5/D12005080501262.html (enabling any
individual or business with an e-mail address to send and receive money online,
PayPal has developed into a "global leader" in online payment technology,
boasting 35 million account members worldwide).
64. See Kevin Sullivan, Virtual Money Laundering and Fraud, ANTI-MONEY
LAUNDERING TRAINING,
http://www.amltrainer.com/assets/images/productpics/KS-
VirtualMoneyLaunderingandFraud.pdf (last visited Apr. 3, 2009) (identifying
vulnerabilities that make a hypothetical money laundering scheme possible).
65. FED. FIN. INST. EXAMINATION COUNCIL, AUTHENTICATION IN AN INTERNET
BANKING ENVIRONMENT 4 (Oct. 12, 2005), available at
http://www.ffiec.gov/ffiecinfobase/resources/infosec/2006/occ-bul_2005-
35.pdf ("[C]ustomer identity verification during account origination . . . is
important to reducing the risk of identity theft, fraudulent account applications,
and unenforceable account agreements or transactions.").
66. See supra Part ll.B.
67. Second Life, How Can I Use My US Dollar Balance?,
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in identifying its customers, they would have to turn to either the e-
mail address provided during registration or the Internet Protocol
(IP) address associated with the account. 6s Yet, neither of these
approaches provides any actionable intelligence if the user intends
to keep his identity secret. 69 In contrast, EU maintains relatively
strict customer identification procedures, and, to the extent that
customer identities are accurately verified, fake accounts can be
reduced. 7°
Virtual worlds are also limited in their ability to monitor
individual financial transactions. Residents can buy, sell, and
exchange currency in nearly unlimited amounts without any
questions asked.7' Presently, there is nothing to indicate that either
EU or SL maintains records of individual financial transactions
between residents. Moreover, once a resident seeks to move funds
from the virtual world and back into the real world, there are limits
on the ability to properly identify the recipient of those funds.
Although vulnerabilities exist, without a documented instance
https://support.secondlife.com/ics/support/default.asp?deptlD=4417 (last visited
Apr. 3, 2009) (follow "Linden Dollars" hyperlink; then follow "General L$
Information" hyperlink; then follow "How can I use my US dollar balance?") (to
make withdrawals, users must "have accurate and complete registration
information, including verifiable billing information"). There does not appear to
be any verification of individual customer identity.
68. See HARRY NEWrON, NEwrON's TELECOM DICTIONARY 506 (24th ed. 2008)
(defining "Internet Protocol Address" as "a unique, 32-bit number for a specific
TCP/IP host on the Internet").
69. Methods used to conceal identity range from using fake e-mail and PayPal
accounts to masking an IP address by moving from server to server. See, e.g.,
Benjamin R. Davis, Ending the Cyber Jihad: Combating Terrorist Exploitation of the
Internet with the Rule of Law and Improved Tools for Cyber Governance, 15 COMMLAW
CONSPECTUS 119, 129 (2006) ("Like any Internet user, a terrorist operative will
find setting up a Website or e-mail account to be a very simple and inexpensive
process. With minimal disclosure requirements (which are difficult, if not
impossible, for providers to verify for accuracy), a cyber jihadist can set up any
number of free e-mail accounts within a matter of minutes."); Kohlmann, supra
note 63 ("[E]nd users often use Internet proxy servers to obscure their location.
These days, they also layer their communications internally to provide an
additional cover.").
70. Entropia Universe: Account FAQ
http://www.entropiauniverse.com/en/rich/5405.html (last visited Apr. 3, 2009)
(explaining the registration process necessary to conduct financial transactions).
71. Certain limits apply depending on the type of account and how long it
has been open. See, e.g., LindeX Exchange: Billing and Trading Limits,
http://secondlife.com/currency/describe-limits.php (last visited Apr. 3, 2009)
(explaining that for residents, during the first thirty days, limits gradually rise from
$10 to $300, and after thirty days, limits can reach between $2500 and $10,000; for
business owners, the limits range from $5000 to $320,000 monthly).
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of virtual terrorist financing, the methodology remains largely
academic. However, as with the spread of other JVTS, an absence
of evidence is not evidence of absence. By combining the
recognized vulnerabilities of virtual worlds with the known traits of
terrorist financing, it is possible to illustrate a hypothetical terrorist
financing scheme in a developing virtual world (VW).
Over the course of two weeks, suppose that sixteen individuals
in five different U.S. cities register to join VW from local coffee
shops." After downloading the required programming, these users
are prompted to register." Although all are men from countries in
the Middle East, southeast Asia, and northern Africa, they supply
nondescript, anglicized names and about half self-identify as
female.14 To fulfill the requisite identity confirmation, they then
provide the free, web-based e-mail address they each created the
day before at another coffee shop. After confirming their new
virtual accounts, all of the men shut down their e-mail accounts
and allow their VW accounts to remain dormant for the rest of the
two-week period.
With their accounts set up and avatars selected, these fifteen
individuals begin blending into VW. They attend social functions
and meet other avatars, and, looking to capitalize on VW's virtual
economy, five of them open in-world businesses. One avatar acts
72. This hypothetical presents VW as a "worst case scenario" in terms of
regulations within virtual worlds so as to highlight the potential for exploitation by
terrorist financiers. While many of the vulnerabilities identified are based on
existing problems in SL and EU, they are not meant to imply that such a scenario
could occur in either of those worlds, but, rather, illustrate the potential for abuse
in future virtual worlds. See generally supra Part II (discussing characteristics of
terrorist financing schemes and the vulnerabilities of virtual worlds).
73. The VW registration process simulates methods used by SL and EU.
However, in VW, there are no attempts to verify the actual identity of the users. Cf
supra notes 67-70 and accompanying text (discussing registration procedures in
SL and EU).
74. Self-selection is just one way of preserving anonymity-a highly attractive
quality of virtual worlds. See Robert O'Harrow, Jr., Spies' Battleground Turns Virtua4
WASH. POsT, Feb. 6, 2008, at DOI ("Intelligence officials who have examined these
systems say they're convinced that the qualities that many computer users find so
attractive about virtual worlds-including anonymity. . . -have turned them into
seedbeds for transnational threats."); Meta-Terror, supra note 18 (statement of
Roderick Jones) ("Anonymity has been a key feature in gaming. Everyone is
anonymous and everyone accepts that .... Once you have that anonymity you
open it to [ ]being misused.").
75. By changing locations, the users effectively mask their IP addresses. See
supra note 69 and accompanying text (discussing methods to mask identity while
in-world).
76. The ease of opening in-world businesses, combined with the increased
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as a virtual real estate broker; one sells virtual lingerie; one runs a
virtual coffee shop; and the other two run stores that transfer real-
world books and paintings, respectively. To handle the anticipated
demand for the virtual and real-world products their avatars are
selling, each of these businesses hires two staff members who
applied by contacting them and providing a pre-approved word.
7
With their businesses established, the avatars go about their
everyday, in-world business, selling their wares and earning VW
dollars (VW$).
Two months after setting up his account, and having given the
others time to establish their new businesses, the last remaining
avatar begins customizing his own virtual life. Having spent the
past eight weeks converting $500 per week into VW$ from a PayPal
account, this avatar now has VW$4000.'5 Over the next week, the
avatar conducts the following transactions with the aforementioned
businesses: he purchases a virtual island home for VW$1000, of
which the real estate broker takes a commission of 50%; he buys
VW$200 worth of lingerie for his virtual girlfriend; each day he
purchases three cups of virtual coffee for VW$5 per cup, for a total
of VW$75; and, with the remaining money, he purchases countless
books and paintings, none of which are ever delivered despite the
transfer of VW$. Within nine weeks, the initial VW$4000 is
spending limits for business owners, make these attractive "fronts" for illegal
activity. See, e.g., IGOR MuTTIK, McAFFE, SECURING VIRTUAL WORLDS AGAINST REAL
ArrAc'Ks: THE CHALLENGES OF ONLINE GAME DEVELOPMENT 4 (Aug. 2008), available
at
http://www.mcafee.com/us/local_content/white-papers/threat-Center/wp_onli
ne-gaming.pdf ('Virtual objects are traded in two connected markets-fully
virtual and real. The intertwining of real and virtual markets is growing, and there
are now real shops in virtual worlds (where you can buy real goods for virtual
money). Both of these markets attract criminal elements.").
77. Like any other business, virtual businesses need employees.
"Employment" is also a means to funnel "income" to numerous avatars in the form
of "salary." See Second Life, Guide to Jobs in Second Life,
http://secondlife.com/support/ (last visited Apr. 3, 2009) (follow "Knowledge
Base" hyperlink; then follow "Second Life for Beginners" hyperlink; then follow
"Guide to jobs in Second Life hyperlink).
78. As discussed supra note 71, to the extent transaction limits exist, they
would not catch these small transactions, especially if the account has been open
for an extended period. But see Catherine Holahan, Policing Online Money
Laundering, BUSINESSWEEK, Nov. 6, 2006,
http://vvw.businessweek.com/technology/content/nov2O6/tc2061106_98694
9.htm?campaignid=bier tcv.g3a.rssfll06u (recommending "imposing limits on
the amounts that can be held in online accounts, thus limiting the potential for
large amounts to be laundered, and implementing 'suspicious activity' reporting
practices").
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transferred into the accounts of the other fifteen avatars. Each
person then exchanges the VW$ back into real-world currency
through PayPal and pre-paid debit cards, and cancels his VW
79account.
Back in the real world, the individuals gather in groups of
three in each of the five cities. With their funds combined, each
group has a little under $1000. They immediately work toward
implementing their "mission," purchasing the materials to create
one improvised explosive device per person. 8 By the end of the
week-less than three months after first signing onto VW-the
fifteen men carry out fifteen suicide bombings in five major cities
throughout the United States. Unable to identify or trace the
source of the funds, or locate the sixteenth avatar that financed the
attacks, law enforcement and intelligence officials are left with
limited leads to investigate the bombings.
As this hypothetical demonstrates, the use of virtual worlds to
finance terrorist attacks is more than merely academic.
IV. REGULATING THE VIRTUAL HAWALA
"We will direct every resource at our command [to win the war against
terrorism], every means of diplomacy, every tool of intelligence, every
instrument of law enforcement, every financial influence.... ,81
"The environment in which terrorists raise, launder, and
transfer funds to further their activities remains all too
,,82permissive .... The complexity and variety of methods available
to terrorist financiers, combined with the difficulties of identifying
these otherwise innocuous financial transactions, requires broader
regulation and enforcement. 83 In particular, the ability of terrorist
79. Through the use of fraudulent PayPal accounts or fake identification, this
money may become effectively untraceable once it leaves the virtual world. See
Holahan, supra note 78 ("Once flush with funds, the [online] accounts can be
used to make purchases without leaving a paper trail to the user the way a credit
card or check would.").
80. It costs very little to gather the materials and create an improvised
explosive device. See LORETrA NAPOLEONI, MODERN JIHAD: TRACING THE DOLLARS
BEHIND THE TERROR NETWORKS 178-79 (2003) (explaining that the cost of making
a suicide bomb can be as low as $5 while deployment of a suicide bomber,
including transportation and reconnaissance, can cost between $100 and $200).
81. Presidential Address, supra note 11.
82. Matthew Levitt, Stemming the Flow of Terrorist Financing: Practical and
Conceptual Challenges, 27 FLETCHER F. WoRLD Arr. 59, 61 (2003).
83. See Lormel, supra note 39 ("Developing mechanisms to identify emerging
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financiers to move between the formal/real-world and
informal/virtual-world financial sectors must be curtailed, and any
policy aimed at doing so must be "all-encompassing ... to have any
chance of successfully disrupting terrorist activity.
A. Developing a Framework to Combat Terrorist Financing
Terrorist financing is a global problem that must be fought• • 85
both domestically and internationally. At the forefront in the
global war on terrorist financing is the Financial Action Task Force
(FATF), an international body dedicated to eradicating moneyS 86
laundering and terrorist financing. The FATF has led the charge
for greater regulation and accountability, offering a list of forty
recommendations that should be implemented world-wide by both
87
the formal and informal financial sectors. Recommendations
integral to developing successful programs to combat terrorist
financing include:
i. identifying all individuals and businesses engaged
in financial transactions, both formal and informal;
ii. obtaining accurate and verifiable information
trends should be incorporated into the risk analysis process.").
84. Levitt, supra note 82, at 61.
85. See Michael Jacobson, Grading U.S. Performance Against Terrorism Financing,
POLICYWATCH/PFACEWATCH (The Washington Institute for Near East Policy,
Washington, D.C.), Sept. 5, 2007,
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC05.php?CID=2656 (explaining
limitations to unilateral action by the United States and that successful anti-
terrorist policy requires broad international cooperation).
86. See generally Financial Action Task Force Home Page, http://www.fatf-
gafi.org (last visited Apr. 3, 2009) (providing an overview of the organization and
its programs).
87. Id. Among the recommendations the FATF suggests:
1) ratifying the 1999 UN Convention on the Suppression of Terrorist
Financing;
2) criminalizing the financing of terrorism, terrorist acts, and terrorist
organizations;
3) freezing and confiscating terrorists' assets;
4) requiring financial institutions to report suspicious transactions that may
be linked with terrorism;
5) assisting in investigations with other countries of terrorist financing
networks;
6) imposing anti-money laundering on alternative remittance systems; and
7) taking steps to ensure that non-profit organizations are not misused to
finance terrorist groups.
Id. (follow "40 Recommendations" hyperlink under "Quick Links").
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through which customers can be identified; and
iii. maintaining records of all financial transactions
and reporting those identified as suspicious to the•• 88
appropriate authonties.
According to reviews by the FATF and the U.S. Department of
the Treasury, the combined implementation of these programs has
had marked success in reducing the abuse of formal financial
institutions by terrorist financiers.
Domestically, many of the FATF's recommendations have been
implemented through the Bank Secrecy Act of 1970 (BSA).90 "The
principal policy goal of the [BSA] is to protect the international
gateways to the United States financial system and to safeguard our
financial system from the abuses of financial crime, including
terrorist financing, money laundering, and other illicit activity.
"
To that end, the BSA requires banks to establish and maintain
effective anti-money laundering programs, implement customer
identification programs, and maintain transactional records.
92
Intended to have a broad reach, the BSA applies to both
88. Id. (primarily relying on Recommendations 5-11).
89. See Martin A. Weiss, Terrorist Financing: Current Efforts and Policy Issues for
Congress, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS, RL32539, Aug. 20, 2004, at 2-5, available at
http://www.usembassy.it/pdf/other/RL32539.pdf (tracing the evolution of
counterterrorism financing legislation from the Bank Secrecy Act to current
regulation under the PATRIOT Act).
90. Bank Secrecy Act of 1970, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1829(b), 1951-1959 (2006); 31
U.S.C. §§ 5311-5322 (2000 & Supp. V 2005). The BSA is a federal recordkeeping
and reporting law applicable to all persons (individuals and organizations)
defined as "financial institutions" under regulations implementing the BSA, found
at 31 Code of Federal Regulations, Part 103. See 12 C.F.R. § 21.21 (a) (2008).
91. William F. Baity, Acting Director, Financial Crimes Enforcement Network,
Keynote Remarks at the Florida International Bankers Association Anti-Money
Laundering Conference (Feb. 14, 2007) (transcript available at
http://www.fincen.gov/news-room/speech/html/20070214.html).
92. U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY, 2007 NATIONAL MONEY LAUNDERING STRATEGY vi
(2007), available at http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/docs/nmls.pdf
[hereinafter MONEY LAUNDERING STRATEGY]; see also 12 U.S.C. § 1829b(a)(1)
(2006) (congressional findings and purpose of rules relating to recordkeeping);
31 U.S.C. § 5311 (2000 & Supp. V 2005) (purpose of rules relating to records and
reports on monetary instruments transactions); 31 U.S.C. § 5312(a) (2000 & Supp.
V 2005) (definitions); 31 U.S.C. § 5318(h) (1) (2000 & Supp. V 2005) (requiring
financial institutions to implement anti-money laundering programs); 31 C.F.R. §
103.22(b) (2008) (requiring covered financial institutions to report each deposit,
withdrawal, exchange of currency, or other payment or transfer that involves a
transaction in currency of more than $10,000); 12 C.F.R. § 21.21(c) (2008)
(describing minimal requirements for BSA promulgations at national banks).
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formal and informal financial service providers. 3 Formal service
providers are generally referred to as "financial institutions" and,
although construed relatively narrowly in 1970 when the BSA was
passed, Congress has repeatedly expanded the meaning of
"financial institution" to keep pace with the ingenuity of criminal
organizations.94 Despite the expansion covering formal financial
institutions, the BSA historically ignored loopholes that prevented
regulation of the vulnerable informal financial sector.
9
5
Less than two months after the September 11 terrorist attacks,
President Bush signed into law, as Title III of the USA PATRIOT
96
Act, the International Money Laundering Abatement and Anti-
Terrorist Financing Act of 2001.9' Recognizing the need "to ensure
that all appropriate elements of the financial services industry are
subject to appropriate requirements to report potential money
laundering transactions to proper authorities,"9 ' Congress sought
to patch many of the holes through which terror financiers had
slipped. 99 Title III expanded existing BSA regulations by ensuring
that all individuals or entities that transfer money, no matter how
formal or informal, must comply with all anti-money laundering
and counter terrorist financing regulations. 00
In its post-PATRIOT Act coverage, the BSA provides greater
regulation of the informal banking system. Section 359 of the
PATRIOT Act specifically addresses underground banking and
93. See 31 U.S.C. § 5312(a) (2000 & Supp. V 2005) (expansive coverage of
businesses and individuals that engage in financial transactions).
94. See id. ("financial institution" includes banks and depository institutions,
casinos and card clubs, broker-dealers, and investment companies). The
regulations promulgated by the Department of the Treasury under the BSA are
found at 31 C.F.R. § 103.22(b) (1) (2002).
95. See Gouvin, supra note 48, at 964 (" [W] hile coverage under the BSA was
far-reaching, it was far from universal. Some financial intermediaries were subject
to it, but others were not.").
96. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56,
115 Stat. 272 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5, 8, 10, 12, 15, 18, 21,
22, 28, 31, 42, 47, 49, and 50 U.S.C.) [hereinafter PATRIOT Act].
97. Id. §§ 301-377.
98. Id.§302(b)(11).
99. Weiss, supra note 89, at 6 ("Given that funds used to finance terrorist
activities are often not derived from illegal activities, prosecution for funding
terrorist activities under the pre-USA PATRIOT Act money laundering laws was
difficult.").
100. Shawn Turner, U.S. Anti-Money Laundering Regulations: An Economic
Approach to Cyberlaundering, 54 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 1389, 1404 (2004).
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expands the definition of "financial institution" to cover 1VTS.'
0 1
The BSA and subsequent Treasury Department regulations
describe these non-bank entities as "money transmitters" or "money
services businesses" (MSB).'°2 Despite the expanded coverage, it is
unclear whether virtual worlds qualify as MSBs, and thus are subject
to BSA regulations.
B. Expanding Current Law to Cover Virtual Worlds
Virtual worlds remain vulnerable to abuse by terrorist
financiers.0 3 Additional measures must be taken to effectively curb
the use of lVTS by terrorist organizations. Bringing virtual worlds
under the umbrella of institutions covered by the BSA is the most
effective method. Once virtual worlds, like all others who engage
in the transfer of money, have a clear responsibility to ensure the
sanctity of the markets, businesses working with regulators can
begin crafting procedures for compliance with the BSA.
1. Declare Virtual Worlds to be an IVTS and Require Registration
Under the existing regulatory framework, every IVTS must104
register with the Treasury Department. The first step in reducing
the potential for abuse of virtual economies is to extend the scope
of coverage to include virtual worlds. Although not traditional
"financial institutions," virtual worlds can reasonably fit within the
broad MSB category of covered financial systems.
The present interpretation of MSB encompasses "any person
doing business, whether or not on a regular basis or as an
organized business, which engages in the transfer of funds."'1
0 5
Virtual worlds like SL and EU not only engage in the transfer of
funds by allowing residents to exchange real-world currency with
101. PATRIOT Act, supra note 96, § 359 (expanding coverage of the BSA by
broadening the definition of "Money Transmitting Businesses").
102. Posting of Dennis Lornel to Counterterrorism Blog, Two Easily Exploitable
Vulnerabilities of Money Services Businesses,
http://counterterrorismblog.org/2008/05/two-easily-exploitable-vulnera.php
(May 21, 2008, 15:41 EST) ("MSBs refer to five distinct types of financial services
providers: currency exchangers; check cashers; issuers, sellers, or redeemers of
traveler's checks, money orders or stored value; the United States Postal Service;
and money transmitters.").
103. See supra Part IL.C (discussing the vulnerabilities of virtual worlds).
104. See 31 U.S.C. § 5330 (2000); 31 C.F.R. § 103.41 (2008) (all IVTS must
register with FinCEN as MSBs).
105. 31 C.F.R. § 103.11(uu) (5) (2008) (defining "Money Transmitters").
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virtual currency, they have built systems in which a virtual economy
is an integral part of their business. Neither new laws nor amended
regulations are necessary to apply existing BSA regulations to
virtual worlds. Rather, the Department of the Treasury merely has
to issue an administrative ruling designating virtual worlds as
covered institutions since a plain reading of current regulations
arguably covers virtual worlds as IVTS. Once existing BSA
regulations are expanded to cover virtual worlds, law enforcement
and intelligence officials can begin cracking down on one of the
last remaining unregulated methods for transferring terrorist
funds.
2. Implement Know-Your-Customer Procedures
Once virtual worlds are placed on notice that they are subject
to BSA regulations, they must implement comprehensive anti-
money laundering and terrorist financing programs.' °6  Such
compliance programs are required of brick-and-mortar financial
institutions and, while admittedly more complicated, expanding
them to virtual worlds will reduce criminal abuse of these
systems. 17 Recognizing the critical role that both formal and
informal financial systems play in the effort to find terrorists, a key
compliance mechanism is that all covered institutions "know their
customer."' 08
Under existing regulations, covered institutions must:
i. identify customers as they open accounts by
obtaining information such as the customer's
name, address, date of birth, and taxpayer
106. See U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY, FIN. CRIMES ENFORCEMENT NETWORK, MONEY
SERVICES BUSINESSES REGISTRATION FACT SHEET n. 1, available at
http://www.msb.gov/pdf/FinCENfactsheet.pdf (last visited Apr. 3, 2009).
107. Despite initial skepticism and opposition to the PATRIOT Act provisions,
increased regulation has been effective in curbing the abuse of formal financial
institutions. See Joseph M. Myers, The Silent Struggle Against Terrorist Financing, 6
GEO.J. INT'L AFF. 33, 35 (2005).
108. MONOGRAPH, supra note 4, at 61. "To fulfill this role properly in the life-
and-death emergencies that can arise, financial institutions must (1) know their
customers by their real names and possess other essential identifying information,
(2) have the ability to access this information in a timely fashion, and (3) quickly
provide this information to the government in a format in which it can be
effectively used." Id. Law enforcement will not be able to develop a
comprehensive strategy for countering terrorist financing until individuals can be
openly identified.
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identification number;
ii. exercise reasonable efforts to verify the customer's
identity;
iii. maintain records and information obtained during
the identification and verification process; and
iv. consult lists of individuals whose assets have been
blocked or frozen. l09
Like their brick-and-mortar counterparts, virtual worlds must
ensure that every avatar with virtual currency can be linked back to
a verifiable name, address, and real-world bank account."' Absent
this basic know-your-customer requirement, anti-terrorist financing
efforts will not be effective. "l
These customer identification and verification procedures,
while potentially costly and time-consuming, are a necessary
expense for virtual worlds looking to profit from the spread of their
economies."' Although this is a developing area of regulation,
traditional banks implemented similar programs when shifting to
online banking.'13  Any effective program must ensure proper
109. See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Treasury, Treasury and Federal Financial
Regulators Issue Final PATRIOT Act Regulations on Customer Identification
(Apr. 30, 2003), available at http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/s335.htm.
110. Todd M. Hinnen, The Cyber-Front in the War on Terrorism: Curbing Terrorist
Use of the Internet, 5 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 5, 66 (2004) ("For traditional
brick-and-mortar banking, this process often involves meeting the customer,
obtaining identifying documents that have photographs or list physical
characteristics that match the customer's characteristics, and observing the
customer's behavior. In an Internet banking context, none of these traditional
techniques is possible.").
111. MONOGRAPH, supra note 4, at 61 (Section 326 of the PATRIOT Act, which
"requires financial institutions to 'enhance the financial footprint' of their
customers by ensuring effective measures for verifying their identity," recognizes
that "effective customer identification may deter the use of financial institutions by
terrorist financiers and money launderers and also assist in leaving an audit trail
that law enforcement can use to identify and track terrorist suspects when they
conduct financial transactions").
112. Many of the same arguments likely made by virtual worlds have already
been proffered by formal financial institutions and rejected by regulators. See, e.g.,
Joseph J. Norton & Heba Shams, Money Laundering Law and Terrorist Financing: Post
September 11 Response--Let Us Step Back and Take a Deep Breath?, 36 INT'L LAW 103,
121 (2002) (arguing that Title III of the PATRIOT Act might impose an onerous
burden on banks).
113. See generally FED. FIN. INST. EXAMINATION COUNCIL, AUTHENTICATION IN AN
INTER'NET BANKING ENVIRONMENT (Oct. 12, 2005),
www.ffiec.gov/pdf/authentication-guidance.pdf [hereinafter AL-THENTICATION]
(discussing the rise in online banking and the application of the BSA
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identification not only during the registration process, but also
during each individual transaction.114 One immediate solution for
companies and clients who want to reduce the amount of personal
information needed is to offer two different accounts-one
permitting residents to engage in financial transactions and one
that does not. Thus, those interested in pursuing their virtual
fortune will be required to enter additional information during the
registration process.
As with origination of bank accounts online, verifying virtual
users' identities is difficult." 5 Online banking services now verify
personal information through the use of: (i) "[plositive
verification[,] to ensure that material information provided by an
applicant matches information available from trusted third party
sources"; (ii) "[1] ogical verification[,] to ensure that information
provided is logically consistent (e.g., do the telephone area code,
ZIP code, and street address match)"; and (iii) "[n]egative
verification[,] to ensure that information provided has not
previously been associated with fraudulent activity." 116  Building
upon these techniques, virtual worlds should collect as much
personal information as practicable and cross-check that
information against public records to verify its accuracy."'
V. CONCLUSION
"It is time to take a fresh look at anti-terrorist financing and
anti-money laundering regulations as we enter the next
administration and next Congress and see what has worked, and
what hasn't, how methods have changed and how to change the
[PATRIOT] Act, the Bank Secrecy Act and other regulations to go
along with that."' '1  As terrorist financiers shift to unregulated
requirements to such new technology); see also Ivan Schneider, Banks Crack Down
on Terror Funds, BANK SYS. & TECH., Apr. 8, 2002,
http://www.banktech.com/story/whatsnews/BNK20020408S0002 (noting "in the
ongoing war on terrorism, banks and their technology providers can best serve the
government by acting as a tripwire for criminals attempting to infiltrate the world
financial system").
114. AUTHENTICATION, supra note 113, at 1.
115. Id. at 4-5.
116. Id. at 13.
117. Id. at 13-14.
118. Posting of Andrew Cochran to Counterterrorism Blog, Assessment of
International Counter-Financing of Terrorism Efforts Needed for Next Administration &
Congress,
http://counterterrofismblog.org/2008/05/assessment-of international_co.php
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financial sectors, law enforcement officials and the tools they use
must likewise evolve. 119
Efforts to disrupt terrorists' ability to fund their operations will
not succeed if focused solely on formal banking or the mainstream
financial sector.120  Instead, U.S. government officials must
implement a comprehensive counterterrorist financing policy that
continues to effectively curtail abuse of the formal financial sector
while implementing broader regulations to address developing
underground banking systems.
With the increasing virtualization of terrorism and the
developing of virtual world economies, law enforcement officials
must carefully consider the opportunity virtual worlds present as
potential informal value transfer systems. Once the vulnerabilities
of these platforms are identified, appropriate patches can be
devised to close the loopholes. The quickest way to move towards
effective regulation is for the Department of the Treasury to
immediately designate virtual worlds as covered institutions subject
to the BSA's anti-terrorist financing regulations. Next, the most
important step will be verifying user identity during registration
and ensuring that each virtual transaction can be traced back to
identifiable senders and recipients.
None of these proposals will be easy to implement and,
unfortunately, no amount of regulation will completely cut off the
financing of terrorist operations. However, to stand idly by and
allow the Internet to remain the last place where criminals and
terrorist groups can anonymously do as they please is unacceptable.
(May 7, 2008, 10:09 EST).
119. Id.
120. See MONEY LAUNDERING STRATEGY, supra note 92, at 3 (explaining other
ways of tracking terrorist financing).
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PART IV: PROFESSIONAL ARTICLES
The following section contains professional articles. The first
argues that national security advice and advocacy should expressly
consider institutional culture's impact. The second discusses the
dichotomy that is often debated when there is a threat to national
security and suggests that such a dichotomy is false. The third,
among other things, proposes ways that our Nation's national
security can best be protected.
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